In this article, I shall consider some principles for rationing and resource prioritization in health.
1 I shall also try to provide philosophical foundations for these principles, beginning at the most basic level. These issues arise at both a micro and macro level. At the micro level, some can fall under what is described as the responsiveness of a health care system, for example, is it procedurally fair between competitors for health care and just in what it gives to each? ("Responsiveness", in the World Health Organization health system performance framework, is used to refer to respect for autonomy, dignity, and confidentiality and allows for the measurement of the distribution of health care.) To apply what I say about fairness and justice to the macro level, often all we have to do is think of cases where how we allocate resources will affect large numbers of people instead of a few. Sometimes, as I shall indicate, there is more to moving from micro to macro.
I shall distinguish between goodness, fairness and justice. To make one distinction clearer, consider the following case: A doctor must decide whether to stop a big pain in person A or a small pain in person B. She thinks, correctly, that she will do more good if she helps A. But she also remembers that yesterday B suffered a much bigger pain than A will suffer and no one helped B (A suffered nothing in the past). So she thinks it would be unfair to let B suffer again, even though she will do less good if she helps him. If it is overall right to do this, this means she does the morally better thing in helping him and the state of affairs in which B is helped rather than A is morally better than one in which A is helped. But this is not because it produces more good.
I distinguish justice from fairness as follows: considerations of fairness are essentially relational, that is, how is A treated relative to B? Justice is concerned with someone getting his due. I can make a situation more just but less fair by giving only one of two people his due when otherwise neither would be given his due. A particular relation between people is equality; sometimes it is fair, but other times, fairness demands inequality-as when one person has morally relevant characteristics in virtue of which he should be treated differently.
Justice and fairness are typically thought to function as "side constraints" on the maximization of the good. That is, unlike the good, they are not treated as factors that we are also treating as goals to be maximized. If they were only goals, it might be morally right to treat someone unfairly in order to maximize fairness overall (or to minimize unfairness). But if fairness is a side constraint, this would account for why such behaviour is often ruled out. This distinction may be important to keep in mind when constructing a measure for the health of populations. Some would like to have a measure that assigns grades to end-states of population health that includes considerations of how fairly health is distributed. But this involves treating fairness as a characteristic of an end-state (i.e. as part of a state which it is our goal to achieve) rather than as a side constraint on bringing about end-states. If we aim to maximize the grade, this may incorrectly lead us to deliberately act unfairly in order to maximize fairness. This is one reason to think of fairness and goodness as separate considerations.
Equality, priority and the veil of ignorance
Some think that providing equal health or health expectations for all persons is a requirement of fairness. This might be denied for several reasons. The first is that if the only way to produce equality of health between people were to reduce the health of some without improving that of anyone, then (all other things equal) this would be morally wrong. (This is known as the "leveling down" objection to equality.) The second reason is that it may be morally most important to raise the health of the worstoff people, even if the route to doing this required us to introduce inequality. For example, suppose the Blues are relatively worse off healthwise and in bad health in absolute terms. The Reds are better off healthwise. If the only way to help the Blues raise up in absolute terms involved introducing a system that helped the Reds even more than the Blues, it might still be morally desirable. Giving priority to helping the worst off might be justified because we thus produce more good. That is, on account of diminishing marginal utility, each unit of resource devoted to the worst off produces more good than if it were given to those already better off. But even holding the amount of good we produce constant, it can be morally more important to help those who are worst off because (other things equal) it is morally more important that a good go to someone who has less. In giving priority to the worst off, we do first compare people to see who is worse off, but then we know whether we are satisfying the priority principle just by seeing if the worst off is getting better off; we need not compare him to someone else, except to know when to stop focusing on him because he is no longer worse off than others. The principles I shall be discussing in the rest of this article are consistent with giving significant priority to those who are the worst off in health care but not neces-sarily consistent with achieving equality or with always helping the worst off at no matter what cost in improved health to those already better off.
Of course, it is an empirical question whether doing what creates inequality in health leads to those worst off in health having better health than they would otherwise have. Empirical data may show that what produces inequality in health also makes those with the worst health worse off in absolute terms than they would be were there equality of health. (I shall return to this issue below.)
One ground for requiring equal prospects for health (understood as normal species functioning [NSF] ) is that it is necessary for equal opportunity to develop and use one's talents and abilities. Norman Daniels argues in this way. The first part of Rawls's second principle of justice requires equal opportunity, and so as a Rawlsian, Daniels argues for equal normal species functioning (Daniels 1985) . If all anyone could want in the way of opportunity were equality with others, there would be no point in introducing inequality of opportunity as a means to making the absolute level of opportunity each person had greater, and hence no justification (within a Rawlsian framework) for such inequality. However, suppose everyone were equally sick; then everyone could still have equal opportunity, for everyone would be working under an equal burden in exercising their talents and abilities. I assume we think that this is not yet an ideal condition even from the point of view of opportunity. Hence we really want more than equal opportunity; we want the degree to which people can use their talents not to be negatively affected by sickness (even if this were to occur equally). If this is so, then it is again at least possible that unequal health could increase the absolute degree to which sickness does not interfere with people's using their talents and abilities. (An easy-toimagine case is one where doctors are kept healthier than others because this is necessary to maximize the health of other members of the population.) 2 This criticism reminds us that equality is only a comparative notion; but we want a certain absolute level of health to be insured as well.
The argument for equal NSF as a precondition for equal opportunity may also face the problem of instability. Suppose talents and abilities are unequal among people and fair incentives result in some being better off economically than others. If health varies with social class (as some data suggest) (Marmot 1999) , then equal NSF will be short-lived; it will undo itself. But those worse off in health may still do better overall (on other dimensions of well-being) as a result of the inequality. (It is even logically possible for them to do better in absolute terms healthwise than with equality, though in fact this may not be true.)
That we think leveling down to achieve equality is morally problematic may bear in an interesting way on a claim made by Christopher Murray and his coauthors (Murray et al. 2000) . They say, "We propose that the relation 'is healthier than' can be defined such that population A is healthier than population B if and only if an individual behind a veil of ignorance would prefer to be one of the existing individuals in population A rather than an existing individual in population B, holding all non-health characteristics of the two populations to be the same." They also say, "Imagine two populations, A and B, with identical mortality, incidence, and remission for all non-fatal health states, but with a higher prevalence of paraplegia in population A. Behind a veil of ignorance, an individual will prefer to be a member of population B" (p. 987). As Murray and coauthors note, it is important whether we use a thick veil, as Rawls does, or rather a thin veil. A veil is thin if it allows people to know a great deal about the different populations, including the differential rates of conditions such as paraplegia. People do not know only who they would be in a community-the person with or without paraplegia. Given knowledge of different rates of illness, they can make probability calculations of getting an illness. Thin veils are involved when people say that the results one gets from using a veil of ignorance can depend on one's risk aversiveness. Rawls uses a thick veil-one doesn't know about the distribution of various conditions in a society or between societies; one is deliberately hindered by Rawls from using subjective probabilities in decision-making. Rawls gets his maximin results-make the worst off as well off as possible-not by assuming that people are very risk averse. He denies he needs this assumption. Rather, if one lacks the data to reasonably formulate subjective probabilities, one is deciding on principles that will determine the whole life prospects of people, and one is a head of family, one need not be risk averse to favour maximin, he thinks. Why does Rawls use a thick veil instead of a thin veil? I shall return to this question at the very end of this article. For now, let us consider the use of the thin veil in the paraplegia case and its relevance to leveling down.
The higher incidence of paraplegia in population A might result in greater equality of health in population A than in B by leveling down. Hence, if one cared about equality from behind a veil of ignorance, one might prefer to be a member of population B. One could avoid this result by insisting that those behind the veil must not care about relational goods such as equality or by insisting that equality not be achieved by leveling down. Without such restrictions on the decision-making of those behind the veil, what a person would choose from behind a thin veil of ignorance will not be an adequate test for which is the healthier society. This problem for the criterion of the healthier society using choice-behind-a-veil arises because a worsening of health might unavoidably produce a characteristic (e.g. equality) of potential interest to choosers behind a thin veil.
Conflicts with different numbers of people
Suppose we are dealing with two-way micro conflict cases between potential recipients of a scarce resource. When there are an equal number of people in conflict who stand to be as badly off if not aided and gain the same if aided (and all other morally relevant factors are the same), fairness dictates giving each side an equal chance for the resource by using a random decision procedure. This is so even though the health outcome would be the same even if we were unfair.
But there may be a conflict situation in which different numbers of relevantly similar people are on either side and they stand to be as badly off and gain the same thing. (In micro situations, there will be few on either side, in macro many.) The following Aggregative Argument applied in a micro context tells us that it is a better outcome if more are helped: (1) It is worse for both B and C to die than for only B to die; (2) A world in which A dies and B survives is just as bad, from an impartial point of view, as a world in which B dies and A survives. Given (2), we can substitute A for B on one side of the moral equation in (1) and get that it is worse if B and C die than if A dies.
But even if it would be a worse outcome from an impartial perspective that B and C die than that A dies, that does not necessarily mean that it is right for us to save B and C rather than A. We cannot automatically assume it is morally permissible to maximize the good, for doing so may violate justice or fairness. (In other cases, seeking the greater good may be correctly constrained by justice. For example, we should not kill one innocent bystander to save five people from death.)
Here is an argument against its being unjust or unfair to save the greater number in the case of A, B and C. The Balancing Argument (I) claims that in this conflict, justice demands that each person on one side should have her interests balanced against those of one person on the opposing side; those that are not balanced out in the larger group help determine that the larger group should be saved. If we instead toss a coin between one person and any number on the other side, thereby giving each person an equal chance, we would behave no differently than if it were a contest between one and one. If the presence of each additional person would make no difference, this seems to deny the equal significance of each person. Thus, justice does not here conflict with producing the most good.
How might we extend these principles to conflicts when the individuals are not equally needy? Consider a case where the interests of two people conflict with the interests of one. The position to which one person would fall (death) and his potential gain (10 years of life) is matched by one of the tandem (D). The potential loss of the second person of the pair (E) is very small, for example, a sore throat. To take away C's 50 per cent chance of having 10 years of life rather than death in order to increase the overall good produced by the marginal benefit of a sore throat cure fails to show adequate respect for the single person who could avoid death and gain the 10 years. This is because from her personal point of view, she is not indifferent between her being the one who gets the 10 years and someone else getting it. The form of reasoning I am here using to justify not maximizing the good gives equal consideration from an impartial point of view to each individual's partial point of view, so it combines objective and subjective perspectives. Hence, I call it Sobjectivity. It accounts for why we should give fair chances. It also implies that certain extra goods (like the throat cure) can be morally irrelevant; I call this the Principle of Irrelevant Goods. Whether a good is irrelevant is context-dependent. Curing a sore throat is morally irrelevant when others' lives are at stake, but not when others' ear aches are. This Sore Throat Case shows that we must refine the claim that what we owe each person is to balance her interests against the equal interests of an opposing person and let the remainder help determine the outcome. Sometimes the remainder is not determinative. Further, so long as what is at stake for C or D is large, no number of the small losses occurring in each of many people should be aggregated on D's side so as to outweigh giving C and equal chance of avoiding the large loss.
The Sore Throat Case also raises the possibility that self-interested reasoning ex ante behind a veil of ignorance cannot be relied on to give morally correct answers. For using such reasoning, each person would consider that he maximizes his expected good by there being a procedure, ex post, which saves the one and also allows us to provide the sore throat cure. Yet this seems the wrong conclusion.
But suppose the additional lesser loss in one of the tandem is losing a leg. We should save a person's life for ten years rather than save someone from losing a leg when all else is equal and these are the only morally relevant choices. However, perhaps it is correct to together save one person's life for ten years and a second person's leg than to give a third person an equal chance at having his life saved. This might be because one and only one life will be saved no matter what we do and the loss of a leg is a large loss. This would be evidence that giving someone his equal chance for life should not receive as much weight from the impartial point of view as saving a life when we would otherwise save no one. (Perhaps we can be more precise: giving each side a 50 per cent chance in the Sore Throat Case is closer to what each side deserves-if the sore throat should raise one side's proportional chance slightly-than giving one side 100 per cent. By contrast, the addition of a leg may raise the proportional chance owed to one side enough that 100 per cent is closer to that figure than 50 per cent.) So far, I have been discussing decision procedures that are consistent with what philosophers call "pairwise comparison". That is, we check to see that for everyone who will fall to a certain level on one side that there is someone who will fall to a very similar level on the other side before we consider weighing in those who will not fall to levels anywhere as bad to determine which side gets aided. This is one way of being sure we help the worst-off people first. However, I have also attended to how great a gain someone could receive if he is helped. For it is possible that if we cannot give the worst-off person very much, we should give more to those who would not be as badly off if not helped. This approach gives some priority to the worst off but not lexical priority. Furthermore, it is possible that principles which involve pairwise comparison to see who will be worse off are requirements of fairness in choosing whom to aid only in micro situations (e.g. in the emergency room). To make macro decisions, for ex-ample, whether to invest in research to cure a disease that will kill a few people, depriving them of ten years of life, or in research to cure a disease that will only wither an arm in many, we might have another principle. It permits aggregation of significant (though not insignificant) lesser losses (which can be corrected) to many people to outweigh even greater losses to a few, even though no individual person in the larger group would have as bad a fate as each individual in the smaller group would have. As such, it does not give absolute priority to helping the worst off (even greatly). As the Principle of Irrelevant Goods emphasized, whether a lesser loss is significant and hence aggregatable over people is judged relative to the nature of the greater loss, and so determining if a lesser loss is aggregatable is context-dependent. On this view, the important point is that whether a lesser loss should be aggregated over people to weigh against a greater loss in others is not merely a function of how many people suffer it, but also of its size relative to the size of the greater loss. There are no number of headaches such that we should prevent them rather than certainly save a few lives.
Notice that this may raise a problem of intransitivity: suppose that relative to n, y is a significant lesser loss. So at the macro level, it may be better to prevent many people from losing y than to save a few from n. But relative to y, z is a significant lesser loss, and so it would be better to save a great many suffering z than a few suffering n. Yet, it may be that relative to y, z is not a significant loss, since "significant" is context relative and so is not transitive.
My suggestion for dealing with this problem is as follows: if we can save a few suffering from n, we may save many from suffering y instead, but we should not go so far as to save a great many from suffering z. (This is so on the continuing assumption that the people are alike in all morally relevant respects besides the size of these losses.) This is true, even though if some suffering n were not present, we should save a great many from z rather than save many from y. This is because which act is correct can depend on the alternatives we can bring about. Finally, in the micro level cases involving different numbers of people, suppose we have a choice between helping one person (A), who will be very badly off and much benefited by our aid, or helping a couple of people (B and C), each of whom will be as badly off as A but not benefited as much by our aid. So long as the lesser benefit is significant, it is morally more important, I think, to distribute our efforts over more people, each of whom will be as badly off as the single person rather than provide a bigger benefit concentrated in one person (other things equal). One way to analyse this situation employs what I shall call Balancing Argument (II): find the part of the potential large gain to A (part 1) that is balanced by the smaller gain to B. Now we must decide how to break that tie between them. If we care about giving priority to those who are worst off, we will care more about benefiting the next person in the group, C, rather than giving an additional benefit (part 2) to A who, having received part 1 would already have more than C. This means that instead of breaking the tie between A-with-part-1 and B by giving A a greater benefit, we break the tie by helping two people, each to a lesser degree.
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Same numbers of people with different relevant features
A theory of the fair distribution of scarce resources should also tell us if certain characteristics that one candidate for the resources has to a greater degree than another are morally relevant to deciding who gets the resource. I call this the problem of allocation when there is intra-personal aggregation, because one candidate has characteristics the other has plus more that make possible greater goods. We have already considered principles that apply when the additional goods we can achieve, if we help one rather than another of the worst-off people, are distributed over several people. The question arises whether we can revise these principles to apply when additional goods we can achieve are concentrated in one person rather than another.
A system I suggest for evaluating candidates for a resource who differ intra-personally starts off with only three factors-need, urgency, and outcome-but it could add other factors later. Urgency is defined as how badly off someone's life will go if he is not helped. "Need" is defined as how badly someone's life will have gone if he is not helped. "Outcome" is defined as the difference in expected outcome produced by the resource relative to the expected outcome if one is not helped; that is, the benefit someone will get from the resource. The neediest people may not be the most urgent. Suppose C will die in a month at age 65 unless helped now and D will die in a year at age 20 unless helped now. I suggest that often this will mean that D is less urgent but needier, since one's life will often have gone much worse if one dies at 20 rather than at 65. (This does not mean we should always help the neediest; for example, if we could only extend the younger life to age 22 but could give the 65-year-old ten years more, this would be a reason to help the 65-year-old). 4 Notice that there is an ordinary sense of urgency in which both C and D are equally urgent, namely they require care just as soon-now-in order to be helped.
5 I have chosen to use "urgent" to refer to how bad one's prospects are; I shall use "urgent-C" (short for "urgent care") if necessary to refer to how soon treatment is needed.
Comparison of WHAT?
In thinking about how urgent or needy someone is, or how good an outcome is, we must think how badly or well will life go, or have gone, in what ways? In microallocation of health services, I believe we should be concerned with the health-way rather than overall well-being (including economic and cultural factors). This means that at the micro level, health is treated as a separate sphere of justice.
6 So, if E would be in worse health than F, the fact that F would be economically much worse off than E is not a reason to say F is more urgent than E is and treat F with the health care resource. But suppose E's health overall has been painlessly much worse than F's in his life (e.g. limited mobility), but F now faces a lot of pain and E just a little. It is possible that we should consider all dissimilar aspects of ill health and help E, so that he will not have had to lead a much worse life healthwise than F. On the other hand, since we can only help E's future in a small way and can do nothing to undo his past, the much greater good we can do for F's future may be determinative. (Some may find the judgment that we should help E more convincing when we ignore E's past but decide based on the fact that he but not F will also have limited mobility in the future. Some may think it correct to consider only how much pain each will have in the future or will have had overall, since some part of this pain is the aspect of well-being we can affect now. I shall not here choose between these conflicting ways of deciding. For more on this, see Kamm (2002) and Scanlon (1998) .
By contrast, at the macro level, when deciding whether to invest in providing one health service or another, it might be that we should make an all-things-considered judgment about how well off people have been or will be. That is, the way in which people have and will fare in health may be considered together with the way they have or will fare economically and culturally. This means health would not be treated as a separate sphere of justice at the macro level. This has important implications for the very idea of "health equity". Suppose, for example, that we can invest in curing a disease that causes the poor to die at age 70 or a disease that causes the rich to die at age 60. If we care about equality, we might chose to invest in the former, since having a nicer life might compensate the rich for having a shorter one; things will be overall more equal if the poor at least live longer, so long as their lives are worth living. So, equity of health-getting the just or fair amount of it-is not inconsistent with inequality of (prospect) for it. (We already knew this as a result of the discussion in section 1, for there the possibility was raised that helping the worst off might, theoretically, require inequality of prospects for health.) Even those who care about equality may not care about equality of (prospects for) health per se but rather equality of a bundle of goods, including health as one good. It is when those who have less on one dimension (e.g. health) also have less on other important dimensions of value (e.g. wealth) that egalitarians should be most concerned about equality on a particular dimension.
Notice that if this is so, it alters how we look at such empirical results as the Whitehall Study. 7 Researchers found a perfect correlation between class and health in the positive direction, that is, as class went up, health went up; as class went down, health went down. Concern with the data should not be merely that there is correlation between wealth and health; presumably, it is the causal direction that is crucial. We should not be disturbed if greater health causes greater wealth, for that just means that when people are healthier, they are more productive, and that is one of the things we expect and even hope for. (Of course, if this were the direction of causality, we may still be concerned that some are healthy and others are not.) We should (plausibly) be disturbed if the direction of causality is such that greater wealth causes greater health so that the poor are not only short on money but also on health. If we are disturbed by this data, assuming the second causal direction, is this best described as concern over inequality of health, that is, concern that all classes do not have the same level of health? Suppose the data showed a perfect correlation, only negative, that is, as class goes up, health goes down; as class goes down, health goes up. I hypothesize that we would not be as concerned with this second result as we are with the first, yet there is just as much lack of equality in health on the basis of class in this second, hypothetical, result as in the first, actual result. I venture that we would be less concerned because we think that the goods of high social class may compensate for the poorer health. When there is such compensation, there may be overall equality between classes.
But, of course, it may be that overall equality is not the right goal, if we can increase the absolute position of some further with overall inequality. So, if wealthier people had better health but the inequalities of wealth were fair (for example, because they improved the absolute condition of the worst off overall, even including their relatively lower health), then the resulting inequality of health might be fair, too. On this view, we should be disturbed by the Whitehall results only because we think the distribution of wealth is unfair (perhaps, in part, because it results in lower absolute health for the worst off with no adequate compensations, by comparison with a different distribution of wealth).
An alternative to an all-things-considered judgment is to treat health as a separate sphere, even at the macro level, in the way we treat liberal freedoms. We would not consider a person who lacked a right to free speech that others had to be adequately compensated by the fact that he has more money than they have. This should also be the position of those who think equal health is a precondition for equal opportunity and equal opportunity has priority over improving the economic or cultural condition of the worst off. If health is a separate sphere, we would have to compare how people are doing just along the health dimension separately, even at the macro level. But notice that if those who have more economic wealth or power than is just are helped to achieve the correct and equal level of health, we may increase the overall unjust inequality between them and others. For this reason we might make getting the correct level of health conditional on the overall better-off people ceding some of the other (admittedly) non-compensating goods they have in greater abundance than others. (One way to do this is require them to pay for their health care.) There is an asymmetry here: we cannot deny them their right to certain health prospects because they have other things; but we could deny them other things because they get correct health prospects. Of course, if inequality in wealth always causes inequality in health (let alone lower levels of health in absolute terms), we may have to decide whether equalizing health (to the extent this is under our control) is worth the requirement of equality in other areas. Alternatively, if there is an intervening mechanism through which inequality in wealth produces differential health, we may be able to just interfere with that mechanism directly.
Weighting of factors
Let us return to need in the microallocation context. To consider how much weight to give to need, we hold the two other factors of outcome and urgency constant and imagine two candidates who differ only in neediness. Often those who will have had the worse life healthwise are those who will have had fewer healthy years if not helped. Then one argument for taking differential need into account is fairness: give to those who, if not helped, will have had less of the good (e.g. life) that our resource can provide (at least if they are equal on other health dimensions) before giving to those who will have had more of it even if they are not helped. Fairness is a value that depends on comparisons between people. But even if we do not compare candidates, it can often be of greater moral value to give a certain unit of life to a person who has had less of life, i.e. the younger.
But need will matter more the more absolutely and comparatively needy a candidate is, and some differences in need may be governed by a Principle of Irrelevant Need, which implies that relative to a context, some differences in need are morally irrelevant. This is especially so when each candidate is absolutely needy, a big gain for each is at stake, and if the needier person is helped he will wind up having more of the good (e.g. a longer life) than the person who was originally less needy than he. Need may also play a different role depending on whether life is at stake or quality of life is at stake, for a low quality of life can be less bad for someone than his dying. When it is, we deprive the needy of less if we do not give them priority when quality of life is at stake, and of more if we do not give them priority when life is at stake. For a different view, see endnote 4.
Suppose there is conflict between helping the neediest person and helping the most urgent person (when we can give each the same benefit). I claim that when there is true scarcity, it can be more important to help the neediest than the urgent. If scarcity is only temporary, the urgent-C should be helped first, since the others will be helped eventually anyway. 8 Still, there are constraints on the relevance of need (one concept of the worst off) in a correct theory of distribution. For example, it may be impermissible to give a resource to the person who will have had a worse life healthwise because he will have less overall of the good we can provide, if it fails to respect the rights of each person. Consider another con-text: If two people have a human right to free speech, how long someone's right has already been respected may be irrelevant in deciding whom to help retain free speech. If having health or life for a number of years were a human right, it might not be appropriate to ration resources on the basis of the degree to which people's rights have already been met (or on the basis of whether they have had more of other goods). On this view, how much life one had already would not be a reason to ration life-saving resources on the basis of age, so long as one had not reached the age guaranteed by right.
An additional consideration that militates against helping on the basis of need where this is linked to rationing according to age relates to the risks it may be rational for each individual to take. Suppose the probability of conditions arising that cause loss of life is low in youth but high in old age, and there is a fixed total health resource budget/per person to be distributed over the course of her life. Assume also that (for the most part) if one dies in youth, one will lose out in a longer future than if one dies in old age and one will also have had a worse life. Even on the latter assumptions, it would not necessarily make most sense to invest resources so as to insure against the smaller probability of death in youth (when the procedures funded by these resources will probably not be used) and ignore much higher probabilities of death in older age (when procedures would be useful). Suppose it turned out to be rational for people to accept some risk of death when young to ensure care when old. Then each person who is old now will have accepted (and survived) the risk he takes when young. It would be unfair to now deny him treatment to help the young person for whom it too was rational to accept the small risk of death through absence of resources (Daniels 1988) . 9 Now we come to outcome. Some might think it appropriate to take into account all the effects of a resource in determining the outcome it produces. By contrast, at least in micro contexts, I suggest:
(1) Effects on third parties whom a resource helps only indirectly should be given less weight than its direct effects, even though these are indirect effects on health. For example, if we face a choice between saving a doctor and a teacher, the fact that the doctor will be irreplaceable in saving lives should not mean that all the lives he will save (an indirect effect of the resource he gets) are counted on his side against the teacher. (Hence, this goes beyond the view that only health effects should count.)
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(2) Some differences in outcome between candidates may be irrelevant because achieving them is not the goal of the particular "health sphere" which controls the resource (e.g. that only one potential recipient in the health care sphere will write a novel if he receives a scarce drug should not count in favour of his getting it. The health care system is not the National Endowment for the Arts). The extra good is frosting on the cake. The fact that someone might accept an additional risk of death (as in surgery) to achieve the "cake plus frosting" for herself does not necessarily imply that it is correct to impose an additional risk of death on one person so that another person, who stands to get the greater good, has a greater chance to live.
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However, it might be suggested that, in life and death decisions, any significant difference between two people in expected life years should play a role in selecting whom to help. This result would be analogous to the claim that if we could save x's life or else y's plus z's leg, we should do the latter. Still, because the large additional benefit would be concentrated in the same person who would already be benefited by having her life saved for at least the same period as the other candidate, I think, it should count for less in determining who gets the resource than it does when the additional benefit is distributed to a third person. This is on account of the greater moral importance of first helping to some significant degree either person avoid the bad fate faced by each, and the diminishing moral value of providing an additional benefit to someone who would already be greatly benefited. (The same issue arises for large differences in expected quality of life among candidates for a resource in situations where improving quality of life is the point of the resource.) 12 Between the irrelevant differences in goods and those that are large enough to outweigh other factors might be differences in outcome that should be treated by giving people chances in proportion to the good of the differential outcome.
What if taking care of the neediest or most urgent conflicts with producing the best relevant difference in outcome? Rather than always favouring the worst off, we might assign multiplicative factors in accord with need and urgency by which we multiply the expected outcome of the neediest and urgent. These factors represent the greater moral significance of a given outcome going to the neediest (or most urgent), but the nonneediest could still get a resource if her expected differential outcome was very large. Furthermore, doing a significant amount to raise those who are very badly off in absolute terms to an appropriate minimal level of wellbeing might have lexical priority over even an enormous improvement in those already much better off.
My views on outcome, need and urgency can be summarized in an outcome modification procedure for allocation. We first assign points for each candidate's differential expected outcome. We then check the absolute level of need and urgency of candidates. If some are below a certain minimal level of well-being and the good we can do would significantly raise them toward the minimal level, these receive the resource. For those above this minimal level of well-being, we assign multiplicative factors for their need and urgency in accordance with the moral importance of those factors relative to each other and relative to outcome. We multiply the outcome points by these factors. The candidate with a sufficiently high point score gets the resource. If the difference is too small to be morally relevant, we give equal chances. If it is in between, chances in proportion to the score might be suitable.
13
QALYs and DALYs
QALYs and DALYs are used to measure the impact illness has on someone in terms of both morbidity and mortality; they also measure the impact of care on someone in terms of reducing both morbidity and mortality. The theory of outcomes is that we can do more than merely count the number of years that will (we expect) be gained as a result of health intervention-note that even this is a step beyond merely considering whether a life has been saved but not considering for how long it will be saved. We also count how good these years will be. So we may multiply the number of years of life by the quality of each year. Alternatively, we may determine how effective aid is by considering how badly someone's life would have gone-or as it is said how disabled he would have beenwithout the intervention. In this way, we see how much reduction in such disabled years we produce by the intervention. We aim to increase QALYs and decrease DALYs, though not by eliminating the life.
How do we measure the quality of a life or the degree to which it is disabled? Philosophers have tried to offer hedonistic, desire-satisfaction, and objective list theories of good and bad lives to answer such questions. That is, they have suggested that a life is of higher or lower quality, depending on how much pleasure/pain there is in it, how many of one's desires (regardless of the object of desire) are satisfied, or how much of certain objective goods (including but not limited to pleasure/no pain) there are in it. But those who use QALYs and DALYs do not use such philosophical theories. They either take surveys of ordinary people (in QALYs) or experts (in DALYs), asking them to rate the quality of various lives with or without various limitations on them. The aim is to assign numbers to the effects of aid. Two tests are often used in achieving this goal: the tradeoff within one life test and the standard gamble test. (I shall deal separately with the test dealing with trade-offs between people.) In the first, we are asked how many years with disability x we would trade for how many years of perfect health. So if ten years of life as a paralysed person would be exchanged for five years as a healthy person (ranked at 1), we know that being paralysed is to be assigned a .5 value. The trade-off test also makes clear that people would exchange some length of life for some increased quality of life (or disability reduction). The standard gamble test asks one to imagine what risk of death one would take (e.g. in surgery) to exchange some length of life at one level of quality/disability for the same length at a higher quality. For example, is a 40 per cent chance of death and a 60 per cent chance of perfect health equivalent to a 100 per cent chance of life with paralysis? The greater the chance of death one would take to achieve perfect health, the worse is the state from which one is escaping, presumably. 14 Let us consider the DALY, in particular. Suppose perfect health is rated at 1; wearing glasses reduces the quality of the life to .999 (and so one is disabled to .001); paralysis brings one down to .5. Having this information can be important in deciding not only how much good we can do if we aid or how much badness will occur if we do not. It can also help us decide whom to aid when we cannot aid everyone, it is claimed. For example, if we think it just to give priority to helping the worst off (not necessarily overall worst, but perhaps only healthwise worst), it is important to know that paralysis is worse than wearing eyeglasses. If we ranked paralysis no lower than wearing eyeglasses, we could not argue in favour of investing in cures or preventions for paralysis rather than nearsightedness (a macro decision) or treating a person to cure or prevent paralysis in an emergency room rather than cure or prevent nearsightedness (a micro decision). Of course, even if we would reduce more DALYs if we treated paralysis rather than nearsightedness, the cost of doing so may be much greater, and hence the DALYs reduced per dollar (cost effectiveness of allocating) might be greater if we instead treated nearsightedness. (If this were so, it also implies that for every one paralysis we cure or prevent we could cure or prevent hundreds of cases of nearsightedness. I shall return to this issue below.)
Notice that I have mentioned both curing and preventing a disability. It would seem reasonable to think that one would want to avoid (and hence prevent a disability) in accordance with how bad it would be to have the disability and hence how much one would want to be cured of it if one had it. If one knew that if one fell into a state x, there would be no good reason to try to leave it, would it be reasonable to want to avoid it? Surprisingly, the answer might be yes as going into the state might be disruptive of one's current plans, but once in it one alters one's plan so that there is no more reason to leave it (Brock forthcoming). Avoiding disruption of current plans might be the only reason to avoid state x. Brock has suggested that this is why nonparalysed people rank paralysis as worse than people who are already paralysed. If avoiding disruption of current plans were the only reason, or at least a contributing reason, to avoid paralysis, it would not be unjust for society to put a higher value on preventing a nonparalysed person from becoming paralysed and a lower value on cur-ing a paralysed person. (Another less normative and more purely psychological finding might be pointed to in this connection. Psychologists Daniel Kahnemann and Amos Tversky (Kahneman 1994) report that subjects ask higher compensation ex ante than ex post for an injury. That is, when asked how much they would want in order to go through some loss, they ask for more than they ask as compensation once they have suffered the loss.)
However, if those with disabilities must engage in less intrinsically valuable activities, and/or have diminished freedom to choose whether to do something or not (even if their remaining options are good ones), these might be reasons, I believe, to rate curing a disability as highly as preventing it. In any case, in what follows, I shall assume this is so.
15
The worst off
Let us now consider some particular allocation problems. Some who recommend employing DALYs also believe that in allocating, we should help those who are worst off first, at least when expense per DALY is the same as it would be if we helped those who were not worst off. Hence, lowering DALYs and helping the worst off are not incompatible. But, even when the choice is between helping two people, helping the worst off need not follow just from trying to minimize DALYs. This is because in helping the worst off, we might not reduce as many DALYs as in helping someone who is not as badly off. If we must choose between helping a greater number of people each avoid a small disability and one person avoid a large disability (when the people are otherwise relevantly similar), total DALYs reduced could be the same. Yet those who think it is right to favour the worst off might still prefer to help that person. Dan Brock (forthcoming) points out that if we just consider people's rankings of various health conditions, and 1 represents perfect health for one year while wearing eyeglasses reduced health by .001 per year, then we could produce as much good by relieving one thousand people of the need to wear eyeglasses for twenty years as if we save someone's life who would go on to live in perfect health for twenty years. But if we should try to help the worst off person (still assuming same cost/per DALY reduced), we should save the life nevertheless.
I agree with Brock about this last case, but notice that preventing the aggregate of small disabilities may not always be the morally wrong answer. For example, suppose that having a sprain for a year reduced one's health to .9. Might saving the life of an eighty-year-old for one additional year really be morally the equivalent of providing (a) ten people with a drug that relieved their sprain for a year, or (b) one person with a drug that relieved his sprain for ten years? (Eighty-Year-Old Case.) The possibility of option (b) should remind us that aggregation can occur intrapersonally-within one life-and that many small losses or gains (in the sense of avoidance of these losses) occurring to one person can have more moral significance than many small losses (or avoidance of these) occurring to many people. For example, twenty small headaches occurring in one life can be much worse than twenty small headaches occurring in the life of twenty people. Notice also that the moral difference between alternatives (a) and (b) decreases depending on whether we conceive of each of the ten people in (a) as either facing one year in their lives in which they suffer from a sprain (a year we can improve) or, by contrast, facing the same ten years of sprain as the person in (b) but having only one year of relief from that greater burden.
Finally, we have been considering a case in which we might save one person's life for a year, and we probably imagine this as rescuing someone from death. But we might put the choice differently: we have to decide when someone is 50 whether to give him medical treatment that is good enough to help him live to age 81 or only good enough to help him live to age 80. If we give him the medical care that only helps him live to age 80, we will be able to help someone not suffer from a sprain for ten years. This case compares intra-personal aggregation in the latter person and long-term prospects for life (rather than rescue efforts) in the former. In such a case, it may be less clear that we should favour extending the life over avoiding aggregate smaller losses than it is in Brock's original case.
What if more DALYs could be reduced if we aid 1 001 people so that they no longer need eyeglasses for twenty years, at less cost per DALY reduction, than if we save someone's life for twenty years? We might still think it right to help the worst off person have his life saved. We could use a method like that embodied in the Outcome Modification Procedure I described above to represent favouring the worst off in a DALY system: multiply the number of DALYs reduced when we help the person who would be worst off if not helped by a multiplicative factor that represents the greater moral value of aiding him. This will also lower the cost/per DALY reduction in her case.
But now consider the following scenario: One person is on island A, and another person is on island B. They share all the same properties, except that one just recently lost a hand and the other did not. We can save the life of either one but not both. Each will be as badly off as the other if we do not help him (dead). But if we help the person without the hand, we cannot reduce DALYs as much. (Call this the Islands Case.) I think it is morally wrong to decide to aid on this ground. We cannot rely on the principle of giving weight to the worst off to account for this conclusion, since each would, by hypothesis, be as badly off as the other if not aided. However, the Principle of Irrelevant Good, which I described above, can account for the right decision.
The point in the Islands Case is that the part of what is most important to each person can be had by either-long life saved with good quality of life. Furthermore, we should take seriously from an objective point of view the fact that each person, from his subjective perspective, wants to be the one to survive. We should, therefore, not deprive either of his equal chance for the great good of extended survival for the sake of producing the additional benefit to one person. This benefit is irrelevant in this context, though perhaps not in another. This is especially true when that one person is someone who would already be getting the other great benefit of additional life. (That is, it is a case of concentrated rather than dispersed additional good.)
Now consider the Islands Case (2), exactly like the Islands Case, except that there are six people on each island and each on island A will have lost his hand while all on island B will be perfectly formed. The additional claim of the Principle of Irrelevant Good is that if any individual's having a benefit that is an irrelevant good is not a reason to deprive someone else of an equal chance for a major good, then no number of these benefits aggregated across many people (possibly yielding a large total) should deprive other people of their equal chances for a major good.
On the basis of these cases, we can see that it is compatible with recognizing that not having a hand makes a life worse to think that, relative to the question of whose life we should save, it could be a morally irrelevant consideration. Hence, targeting funds to replace a missing hand is not inconsistent with giving equal weight to saving the lives of the disabled and the non-disabled. 16 
Ex ante objections
Here are two objections that may be raised to giving two people equal chances to have their lives saved when one will yield a larger benefit or reduction in disability: (1) The paralysed person would himself accept some additional risk of death if the treatment we used on him would insure his not only living but being cured of paralysis. (People do, after all, undergo surgery with risk of death in order to remove their disabilities.) Does this not mean we should be allowed to impose that greater risk of death on him in order that someone else live in a nonparalysed state? (2) Ex ante, behind a veil of ignorance, before we know whether we are paralysed or not, we would assume that we had an equal probability of being the paralysed or nonparalysed person. Hence, we increase our own chances of living a nonparalysed life-which we prefer-if we agree, ex ante, to a policy which always saves the nonparalysed person's life. (The conclusions of (1) and (2) differ slightly, since (1) may only require us to give a greater proportional chance of survival to the person who will not be handicapped; (2) requires complete preference.)
My response to (1) is that being willing to take a risk of death in order to achieve a benefit for oneself is morally different from risking death in order to benefit someone else. The response to (2) is related to the response to (1), since a similar use of ex ante reasoning in (1) could suggest that one is, in a sense, taking the risk for oneself. This is because behind a veil of ignorance, one should think that for all one knows, it is oneself who will be benefited if the odds favour the non-handicapped person. My response to this extension of (1), as well as to (2), is that this form of ex ante reasoning is a moral mistake. As Thomas Scanlon has pointed out (Scanlon 1982) , it is a mistake to think of people behind the veil of ignorance deciding what is morally correct by each imagining that he might possibly occupy any one of various positions in real life, though, of course, he can occupy only one. Someone who reasons in this way might, for example, maximize his average expected good by allowing some positions to be very much worse than others, if he is taking the small risk of falling into a bad position for the sake of a greater probability of falling into the good ones. An alternative is to view the veil of ignorance as a device that forces each person to identify with each of the separate individuals who will actually occupy the various outcome positions. When different people will actually occupy the different possible positions, some person will definitely (not just possibly) be abandoned, while others will benefit. Deciding how it is appropriate to treat these people in relation to each other is not answered either by one person imagining that he might be in the worst position (for this is comparable with no one actually being in it) or by saying that how we treat a person is acceptable so long as he stood to maximize his expected outcome by taking the risk of being treated in that way.
This analysis of ex-ante reasoning brings one to the final major point I wish to make in response to some of those who wish to employ QALYs and DALYs. They note that the data on trade-offs and gambles shows that individuals are willing to trade life years for improved quality of life or reduced disabilities. So, for example, suppose someone is willing to take a 5 per cent risk of death (thereby risking losing, let us say, twenty years of life) in order to have a 95 per cent chance of being cured of paraplegia. From such data-which we can refer to as an individual welfare function-they would like to derive implications for society as a wholederiving a social welfare function. Apparently, they think the above data from the individual case would validate the conclusion that as a society, we can allow five people to die of one disease so that 95 people can be cured of paralysis when the one hundred are otherwise relevantly similar for moral purposes. (This presumably would be true in a microallocation scheme, where the one hundred people came into the emergency room at the same time, as well as in a macro decision about how to invest our research funds. Recall that I considered distinguishing the micro from the macro decision.)
But is this a correct argument for trade-offs between people? When an individual takes a chance, no one may die and he may benefit. Indeed, he takes the risk hoping this is so. And when each person in the society thinks of the gamble in his case, he may also imagine that he will not die and hope to benefit. But in the group, some people will certainly die (given that it is large enough) and others will be benefited. Further, each person hopes that this certain death will be someone else's. Perhaps this is a morally significant reason not to derive the social welfare function from the combination of individual welfare functions. To repeat, it can be argued that we will get the morally wrong principle of social justice, if we think that ex ante reasoning behind a veil of ignorance involves each person thinking of what probability he has for occupying each outcome-position-for example, 95 chances to be one of the cured, and five to be one of the dead. Rather, the veil of ignorance should lead each person to take seriously the fates of the separate persons who will actually occupy each of the outcomepositions, including the ones involving death.
Indeed, to return to an issue raised at the beginning of this chapter, Scanlon believes that forcing people to identify in this way with each person is why Rawls uses a thick veil (excluding probability calculations). If we engage in policies that we know will leave some to die to achieve lesser goods for a greater number of people, we must be able to give a justification to those who will die. Scanlon implies that saying to them either "you would have chosen to run the risk of being someone who will be left to die" or "you would have chosen to run the risk of being left to die" are not sufficient justifications. Though there may be others.
Notes 1 I dealt with this issue at length in Morality, Mortality, Vol. 1 (Kamm 1993 ).
2 Rawls' first principle of justice calls for maximal equal liberty. This too means that it is possible that unequal liberty could increase the absolute level of liberty of some from what it would be under non-maximal equal liberty.
3 I developed this additional balancing procedure in responding to Derek Parfit's discussion of cases of this sort in an unpublished manuscript.
4 It is interesting to note that most ordinary people surveyed by Erik Nord disagree that being older makes someone less needy of more life than a younger person. Furthermore, they think that where life is at stake there should be less distinction between helping young and old, while when quality of life is at stake one might favour the young. Their (unconscious) reasoning seems to be the opposite of the one I would suggest for these two cases, i.e. when something very important (life) is at stake, they think we should not distinguish between people; when something less important (quality) is at stake, we may distinguish between young and old. I get the opposite result by taking seriously that having had more life can make one less needy of that very important thing, other things equal. See Nord et al. (1995) .
5 As pointed out to me by Derek Parfit.
6 For the idea of separate spheres of justice, see Walzer (1983) .
7 Cited in Marmot (1999) .
10 It might be suggested that this is true because the person who would not be selected for aid is being inappropriately evaluated from only an instrumental point of view, and not also as an end-in-himself. That is, because he is not useful to others, he is rejected. But consider the following case: we have a scarce resource to distribute and if we give it to A, he can then also carry it to another person, C, who needs our resource. B cannot do this. In this case, it is permissible, I think, to select A over B, excluding B since he cannot be instrumentally useful. Doing this helps us to better serve those who directly need our resource. Hence (surprisingly), it seems it is not essentially distinguishing persons on the basis of their instrumental role that determines if our behaviour is objectionable, but whether we are using our resource for its best direct health effects.
11 Again, this conclusion conflicts with the choice that would be made if each person behind a veil of ignorance were trying to maximize his expected good.
12 Erik Nord claims that most of the people he surveyed do not care about the length of life that someone will live in deciding whom to help (above a significant outcome), but they do care about the probability of someone achieving any significant outcome. Presumably, this means they would favour giving a resource to someone who will almost certainly achieve a good outcome, rather than to someone who would have a much lower chance of a good outcome. But if one is offered certainty of getting two years of extra life with one treatment or a 50 per cent chance of twenty years with another treatment, and one is young, it is not unreasonable to think one is doing better to take the latter option. But, if we combine people's surveyed tendency to discount degree of good outcome with the relevance in their mind of probability of good outcome, we conclude that they would favour giving the resource to the person when he chooses the first treatment, but not the second, if it is scarce. This favours the conservative over the maximizers inappropriately, it would seem. See Nord (1995) .
13 This can still be only a rough guide where more than two candidates are present. Since what we ought to do is a function of what the alternatives are, it may not always be right to produce what gives the higher score. For example, in the case I discussed on p. 690 involving one person who will lose n, many who will lose x and yet more who will lose z, I argue that we should help prevent z rather than x if it were only a choice between x and z, but should help x if it were a choice between all three.
14 Is it possible that state A could be worse than B and yet we would take a greater risk of death to avoid B than A? Yes, if there were some reason why it would be inappropriate to risk death to avoid A in particular (e.g. because one deserved A), Certainly, we could take an equal risk of death to avoid state A and state B, and yet one of the states is worse than the other, since the less bad one is already bad enough to make a maximal risk worthwhile. The validity of the gamble test is threatened by these possibilities.
15 Wanting a cure for a longstanding condition could be an indication that the cured life is thought to be better even by the disabled person, though it might just indicate a desire to be like the majority. If the majority were disabled and they desired a cure, however, this would be stronger evidence that the condition is worse than the non-disabled one.
16 I do not claim that this is a complete analysis. There is much more to be said about disabilities and the equitable distribution of resources. For more on this, see my "Deciding whom to help, health-adjusted life years, and disabilities" (Kamm forthcoming), and "Disabilities, discrimination, and irrelevant goods" (Kamm forthcoming).
